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The G20 states have made a commitment to drastically lower the gender dif-
ferential in their labour markets. All G20 states, including India, will have 
great difficulty doing so, as the disparity is a consequence not of formal de-
ficiencies, but of informal norms and value attitudes. It will take both time 
and holistic approaches on the domestic and international levels to change 
this.
 • Gender justice will feature more prominently at this year’s G20 summit under 
the German presidency. At past summits, the issue was rather neglected. The 
2014 Brisbane Declaration represented a watershed moment, as the G20 states 
committed to reduce the gender gap in the labour market participation rate by 
25 per cent by the year 2025.
 • Women’s employment rates in some countries are, however, stagnating – in 
India they have even dropped. Neither economic growth nor statutory require-
ments or strides in women’s education have improved the situation. Given all 
this, the question arises of how the stated objective can be reached.
 • The Modi government has developed a new strategy to increase women’s par-
ticipation in the labour market that includes attracting textile and other manu-
facturing industries and promoting self-employment and professional qualifi-
cations.
 • It remains to be seen whether the measures will succeed; whether low-paying 
jobs in the textile industry will truly lead to good jobs; and whether this will 
increase women’s levels of societal, political, and economic participation. A 
change in discriminatory value attitudes is particularly crucial.
Policy Implications
The G20 states are in at least verbal agreement that gender justice is fundamen-
tal to sustainable and socially just economic growth. The increase in women’s 
labour market participation should be seen as just one step in the right direction. 
To help create vital jobs in India, Germany should advocate for holistic political 
measures in the context of its G20 presidency, and the EU and the G20 should 
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The G20 and Global Social Problems
It may come as a bit of a surprise that the informal club of the economically and pol-
itically most powerful countries on Earth is now also dedicating itself to “soft” top-
ics. Since its significance increased in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 
2008/09, the G20 has dealt primarily with “hard” economic and financial issues. In 
recent years, however, the group has taken on topics such as the globally increasing 
concentration of wealth, global unemployment (especially among young  people), 
poor working conditions, and, last but not least, inequalities between men and 
women in the workplace. This trend emerged from a context in which the original 
approaches to overcoming the financial crisis tied in closely with topics of financial 
market regulation; the dampening of global economic imbalances; the avoidance of 
fiscal and monetary competition; energy and climate policy; the fight against cor-
ruption and terrorism; and the promotion of development, social inclusion, and 
a more equitable distribution of wealth. In that context, the topic of eliminating, 
or abating, global gender discrimination was close at hand. The recognition that 
gender inequality is not only a question of social justice but also one of immense 
economic importance contributed to this trend (OECD, ILO, World Bank, and IMF 
2014).
One can, of course, question whether this broadening of the G20 agenda really 
led to an increase in the impact of its action plans or the dedication of its mem-
ber countries to the group’s jointly declared objectives. The 2012 G20 summit in 
Mexico, for example, resulted in more than 50 recommended individual actions in 
its final declaration, for which 27 international organisations were called upon for 
assistance (Knaack and Katada 2013). The Turkish proposal for the 2015 summit in 
Antalya contained 35 broad areas of action, while the German proposal for the up-
coming summit in Hamburg contains no less than 16. When looked at in a positive 
light, the multiplication of the fields of action could be seen as a movement toward a 
holistic perspective of global development. However, when seen negatively, it could 
be regarded as a reaction to the ineffectiveness of earlier, more narrowly based rec-
ommendations in the political core areas of economic and financial policy. In this 
respect, things are not looking very good, especially for the less developed members 
of the G20 (Kirchner 2016), nor does this bode well for the promotion of gender 
equality, though fatalism would be out of place.
In the following, we seek to highlight the context in which gender equality be-
came a topic at the G20 level. To illustrate this process, we examine the current 
situation in India with regard to the participation of women in the workforce. Based 
on this, we develop possible solutions to be derived within the G20 and discuss the 
role of Germany and other industrialised countries. 
The G20, the W20, and the Demand for Gender Equality
The international debate on the empowerment of women and gender equality goes 
back several decades and celebrated its first success at the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
adopted in 1979 – and ratified in 1993 by India as well. CEDAW was followed by 
the Beijing Declaration in 1995, which includes a number of gender equality prin-
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ciples. At the level of the European Union (2002) and the African Union (2005), 
gender equality has likewise been officialised through contracts. In 2015/16, the in-
ternational community also agreed on the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) 
(Agenda 2030), with Goal 5 explicitly requesting gender equality and Goal 8 de-
manding full and productive employment for women and men alike as well as equal 
pay for work of equal value by the year 2030.
At the G20 level, gender inequality was first addressed at the 2012 Los Cabos 
summit, where the low social and economic participation of women was identi-
fied as a major obstacle to economic development. At the Saint Petersburg sum-
mit a year later, the demand was made for more financial education for women, 
among other things as a means to develop women’s entrepreneurial potential. The 
Brisbane Action Plan (G20 2014), for its part, stated as its first concrete goal that 
the gender gap in labour market participation be reduced by 25 per cent by 2025 – 
albeit in a somewhat diluted form due to the phrase “taking into account national 
circumstances.” In the following year at the summit in Antalya, the obligation to 
monitor the participation rate of women then became more binding. The Antalya 
summit was also where the initial steps were made for Women 20 (W20), a G20 
dialogue group dedicated to the promotion of women in the member countries and 
constituted solely of female delegates from the G20 countries.
The W20 meets regularly before each G20 summit and met most recently in 
Berlin from 24 to 26 April 2017. At the 2016 G20 summit held in Hangzhou, the 
G20 action plan did not add anything new as regards gender, which might have 
been due to the fact that China wanted to keep the agenda rather limited and that 
gender equality was not one of the main goals (see Biba and Holbig 2017). More-
over, although the summit had pledged to play a pioneering role in the implementa-
tion of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to orient its own action 
toward the sustainable development goals (SDGs), Goal 5 (gender equality) was not 
given any particular priority (see G20 2016). Nonetheless, the W20 evolved and 
became stronger with this summit too. For the summit in Hamburg this year, under 
the presidency of Germany, the German federal government formulated a priority 
plan that focused mainly on the core themes of the G20. These are: economic de-
velopment; strengthening the global financial architecture; international trade and 
employment; and, somewhat secondarily, the elimination of discrimination against 
women in employment, pay, and digital inclusion, as well as access to loans for 
business start-ups.
The W20 is, in comparison, much more concrete in its support for women. For 
example, it calls for gender-based tax revenue assessments, analyses, and budget 
planning in all areas, as well as the preparation of national action plans regarding 
the Brisbane gender gap goal, including the monitoring of progress with the help 
of the OECD and the ILO. It also pursues the targeted promotion of female entre-
preneurs and women’s cooperatives; the special digital support of girls and women; 
and the complete closing of gender gaps in training, education, and pay. Finally, 
the W20 calls for the elimination of legal barriers to women’s economic ownership 
and aspires to break societal norms that discriminate against women and to fight 
against violence against women – all measures that have been sorely missed in the 
G20 action plans (Women 20  Germany 2017). 
It is striking that women’s increased participation in the labour market, in the 
allocation of loans, and in terms of digital inclusion has thus far been seen in all ac-
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tion plans primarily in light of the contribution to economic progress and increased 
productivity, in other words, as purely functional. This means that the reduction of 
social inequalities, and the associated dangers of such inequalities to social stabil-
ity, has played only a secondary role and has almost never been seen as a human 
value to be promoted in and of itself. Yet all the while, ensuring that half of the 
world’s population can participate equally in all areas of life should be, or is, a mat-
ter of protecting human rights and social justice. A hint of hope is that this year’s 
G20 is putting an increased emphasis on the quality of labour and employment 
relations, pay gaps, and old-age poverty of women. This can be seen from the final 
declaration of the meeting of the G20’s labour ministers on 18 and 19 May in Bad 
Neuenahr (G20 2017), which extended well beyond matters concerning economic 
growth.
Mixed Success among the G20 Members
The evaluation of progress made in the consideration of women’s rights in the G20 
leaves little room for euphoria and optimism. The fact that it was possible to even 
agree on a definite goal, in Brisbane, for closing the gender gap in labour by 25 per 
cent can be attributed to the demographic development of some the member coun-
tries. The EU28 countries as well as China, Japan, Korea, and Russia are anticipat-
ing, some to significant degrees, a decline in their overall labour force participa-
tion rates (with a corresponding impact on growth and economic momentum) if the 
participation rate of women does not increase (OECD, ILO, World Bank, and IMF 
2014). Germany, for example, anticipates a decline in its labour force participation 
rate of up to 10 per cent by 2025 should nothing change in the current situation. 
At the same time, the goal of increasing the G20’s gross domestic product over the 
next five years by 2 per cent beyond the expected growth would hardly be possible 
without a rise in the women’s employment rate.
The G20 member countries by no means finish first when it comes to achieving 
gender equality. According to the aggregated indicator of the Global Gender Gap 
Report (World Economic Forum 2016), they tend to be in the lower or middle ranks 
among the 144 countries for which complete data sets are available. Germany ranks 
13th, which is relatively good, but is surpassed by the Scandinavian countries and 
even a few developing countries. Saudi Arabia ranks number 141, while Turkey, 
South Korea, and Japan are also far behind. China, Indonesia, India, Brazil, and 
Russia are likewise on the lower end of the spectrum. When only the indicator “eco-
nomic participation and opportunities” is taken into account, the emerging markets 
fall back even more in the ranking, in particular India, Indonesia, Argentina, Mexi-
co, and Brazil. That said, many other countries fail to get good marks in this respect 
as well, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Korea, Japan, Italy, and South Africa. This 
is far from being an impressive result.
In the following, we present the situation of women, alongside associated gov-
ernment measures, in India. The country seemed to offer a useful example given 
the enormous population size and the global media attention garnered by gender 
issues, especially violence against women. In addition, unlike the case for the highly 
populated China, for example, reliable data on gender discrimination is available 
for India. 
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ties 2016 – rank
Saudi Arabia 21,0 57,8 141 142
India 27,2 51,6 87 136
Turkey 32,3 43,5 130 129
Mexico 47,8 35,2 66 122
South Africa 48,3 13,4 15 63
Indonesia 52,5 32,5 88 107
Italy 54,2 20,8 50 117
Korea 55,2 22,4 116 123
Argentina 56,1 24,8 33 101
Brazil 60,8 22,4 79 91
Japan 63,4 20,9 111 118
France 66,7 8,7 17 64
United States 67,6 11,2 45 26
Russia 68,2 9,9 75 41
Spain 68,8 12,4 29 72
China 70,3 14,0 99 81
Australia 70,4 12,1 46 42
Great Britain 71,0 12,3 20 53
Germany 71,1 10,7 13 57
Canada 74,3 7,3 35 36
Participation of Women in India
India still has a young and growing population and will replace China as the most 
populous country in the world in the foreseeable future. Over the past 10 years, In-
dia’s population has grown by about 180 million to about 1.26 billion people. This 
means that India’s labour pool will be growing for a longer time, which constitutes 
a competitive advantage. That said, a growing reserve labour pool can also become 
a burden when an economy is unable to provide sufficient jobs.
Since 2000, India’s economy has repeatedly seen growth of 8 per cent or more. 
At 7.5 per cent, India is currently the fastest-growing G20 economy. However, de-
spite high economic growth, the number of jobs has grown only slightly – a phe-
nomenon which economists refer to as “jobless growth.” In India, this is due mainly 
to the services sector, which is responsible for most of the growth yet which has 
created few jobs. In addition, India has to contend with weak industrial growth, a 
declining agricultural sector, the global downturn as a result of the financial and 
economic crisis in 2008, and the increasing mechanisation of formerly labour-in-
tensive industries.
According to the Indian government’s current employment report (Govern-
ment of India 2016a), only 27.4 per cent of women are currently employed, com-
pared with 75.5 per cent of men (aged 15 years). This corresponds to a gender gap 
of approximately 48.1 percentage points. Indeed, this places India second to last, 
after Saudi Arabia, of all G20 countries with regard to the participation of women. 
In addition, compared to Saudi Arabia, the women’s employment rate in India has 




ticipation Gap, and 
Gender Gap Indica-
tors, 2012 and 2016
Sources: OECD, ILO, 
World Bank, and IMF 
2014, and World Eco-
nomic Forum 2016.
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even declined over the last decade. According to calculations done by Lahoti and 
Swaminathan (2016), the women’s employment rate (for 25- to 59-year-olds) de-
creased by 25 percentage points between 1983 and 2012.
One likely reason for the decline in the women’s employment rate is that  women 
are increasingly pursuing lengthier training and education programmes and path-
ways, resulting in their postponed entry into the labour market. In addition, with an 
increase in India’s median household income, women are less compelled to gener-
ate an additional income – although this often sets them back into the role of the 
housewife. Another main reason is that, compared to China and Bangladesh, In-
dia’s growth is based primarily on domestic demand (ADB 2017) and relies only to 
an insignificant degree on the export-oriented, processing industry. In rural areas, 
employment opportunities for women have dwindled and have not been offset by 
new jobs outside agriculture. In addition, the need for women with better-educated 
backgrounds is rather low in the service sector. 
India’s working women work primarily under precarious terms and conditions, 
a situation that has been exacerbated by the increase in informal employment. Most 
newly created jobs have been generated in the organised sector, yet have nonethe-
less been informal in nature. Formal employment, for its part, has even declined. 
According to official data (see Table 2), the majority of women in employment are 
either self-employed (42.9 per cent) or are employed as casual workers (41.9 per 
cent). The proportion of employees and regular wage earners is just 12.5 per cent. 
This means that approximately 74 per cent of the female workforce is not entitled 
to social benefits (Government of India 2016a). As in the industrialised countries, 
women in India are, on average, paid less for equal work. It is estimated that the 
average hourly wage gap is higher than 30 per cent (ILO 2016).
Overall, the rate of women’s employment in India is higher in rural regions 
than in cities. In addition, it varies significantly across regions – for example, be-
tween 10 (Bihar) and 68 per cent (Himachal Pradesh) in 2009/10. Differences in 
the participation of women are also found between social groups. Women belong-
ing to the Dalit caste (untouchables) or an Adivasi tribe are more employed than 
women from other disadvantaged castes or higher castes (see Table 2). The lowest 
labour participation rate is found among women of the Muslim minority.
The deep-rooted gender inequality in the labour market – and beyond – results 
from the fact that India is still a male-dominated society. Men control the political, 
economic, religious, social, and cultural spheres. Society’s dominant patriarchal 
norms and values not only hamper the entry of women into the labour market but 
also the success of working women. These norms and values are often passed on 
and even legitimised within the family, caste, community, and religion. This is re-
flected in discriminatory practices such as gender-specific abortions, violence of all 
kinds against girls and women, and gender disparities in education and health (see 
Drèze and Sen 2014). For example, in spite of all efforts at state intervention, India 
still has an alarmingly low ratio of females to males, which has worsened in the past 
two decades. According to recent surveys, there are only 919 female children per 
1,000 male children (Government of India 2016b). [1]
1 The natural ratio is 
952 female children for 
1,000 male children. Any 
deviation from this ratio 
points to gender-specific 
abortions (Government of 
India 2016b).
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Men Women Gap Total
City 69,1 16,6 -52,5 43,7
Countryside 78,0 31,7 -46,3 55,8
Total 75,5 27,4 -48,1 52,4
Self-employed 48,6 42,9 -5,7 44,9
Salaried/wage workers 17,4 12,5 -11,1 19,0
Contract worker 3,8 2,7 -1,1 4,7
Casual worker 30,2 41,9 +11,7 31,5
Total 100 100 100
Untouchables (Dalits) 77,7 31,8 -45,9 55,6
Indigenous tribes (Adivasi) 79,3 42,5 -36,8 61,5
Other lower castes 75,8 27,3 -48,5 29,1
Other castes 72,7 20,1 -52,6 47,4
People not entitled to social services 70,4 74,0 +3,6 71,2
Measures Taken by the Indian Government
Due to its population trend, India faces the challenge of having to provide sufficient 
and good jobs for its young and growing population. Given that the current eco-
nomic growth has created fewer jobs than hoped for, the current government coali-
tion under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been, since 2014, pursuing a clear 
strategy for achieving employment-intensive economic growth.
One of the most important measures under the motto “Make in India” is to 
expand India into a global production location. Plans are to increase the share 
of industrial production in the gross domestic product from 15 to 25 per cent by 
2022, thereby creating 100 million new jobs. A total of 25 industry sectors have 
been selected as investment targets and partly opened to foreign direct investment 
(Neff 2015). One of them is the textile and clothing industry, which mainly employs 
women.
From a purely mathematical point of view, however, a total of about 64 million 
jobs for women would have to be created in order to close the gap in the labour 
force participation. In view of the current decline in the rate of women’s participa-
tion in labour, this objective does not appear to be realistic. At the same time, the 
question arises whether the world economy still has room for a “second China” that 
is focused on labour-intensive products. For even if labour-intensive production 
sectors were to withdraw from China, the increase in the number of jobs for India 
might well be small given the growing automation and digitisation of labour that is 
affecting all sectors. Moreover, jobs in the textile industry are generally poorly paid 
and thus hardly contribute to the economic empowerment of women.
In addition to the goal of creating jobs in the manufacturing sector, India’s gov-
ernment under Modi is also supporting, through its “Start Up India” initiative, en-
trepreneurs through loans, tax cuts, and a reduction of bureaucracy. These efforts 
are explicitly targeted to women alongside the other disadvantaged social groups. 
Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded in April 2017 at the W20 meeting 
Table 2  
Participation by Gen-
der, Place, Type of 
Employment, Social 
Group, and Social 
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in Berlin that women entrepreneurs be promoted specifically through loans. How-
ever, in India many women work as micro and small entrepreneurs, and can barely 
keep themselves above water. Moreover, contrary to expectations, the majority of 
these entrepreneurs are not creating additional jobs but are only active for a lack of 
alternatives.
What Can Germany’s G20 Presidency Do?
On 1 December 2016, Germany took over the G20 presidency. Among its priorities 
for the summit in Hamburg on 7 and 8 July 2017 is the goal of increasing the ben-
efits of globalisation and distributing them more broadly (G20 2017). The identi-
fied priorities are to strengthen the economic power of the member countries and 
sustainable development. The topics of digital inclusion – a favourite of the federal 
chancellor – and the empowerment of women are subsumed under sustainability.
Since the W20 is likewise supportive of grouping gender equality under sus-
tainability, the German federal government has the opportunity to have significant 
influence on the agenda and action plan at this year’s summit. However, whether 
successful negotiations will then translate into actual improvements for women in 
practice is another question. It has often been pointed out that improvements in the 
legal framework or the establishment of institutions for the advancement of women 
do not always manifest in actual improvements. This applies even more to interna-
tional agendas and communiqués, which include neither binding international ob-
ligations nor sanctions – all of which is well-known. It would therefore be advisable 
to plan all the measures carefully and by drawing on professional expertise in order 
to be able to implement them in a targeted manner (Narlikar 2017). In addition, 
it would be useful to complement the often flowery declarations of intent through 
verifiable objectives and timetables, which would open up the possibility of collec-
tive criticism and peer pressure from other member states. A suitable instrument 
would be, for example, performance monitoring under the aegis of the W20. The 
members of such a committee should, in accordance with the W20 recommenda-
tions, be offered insight into the G20 negotiations and Sherpa meetings.
Essentially, the problem of all policy measures for advancing equality is that 
they are planned individually and do not have an overview of the bigger picture of 
gender relations. Within the framework of the decisions of the G20 countries, it 
has become clear that although it is possible to agree on the financial and, probably 
soon, digital inclusion of women, the task of promoting the social and political par-
ticipation of women will remain with the individual member countries. Compared 
to other global problems such as climate change, gender equality is viewed primar-
ily as a problem to be solved at the national level. For this reason, a stronger focus 
on SDG Goal 5 at the G20 level would not suffice to ensure significant progress.
Against this background, it is all the more important to make sure that the 
more holistic policy measures identified by the G20 ministers in 2014 and most 
recently in 2017 (see G20 2014; G20 2017) are implemented in the individual coun-
tries. These measures include, in addition to lifelong education and training, the 
expansion of childcare and the provision of care for the elderly; paid parental leave; 
family-friendly jobs; the abolition of legal restrictions with negative impacts for 
women; the fight against discrimination in the workplace, including that related 
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to remuneration and promotions; the expansion of the social safety net (especially 
for workers in the informal sector); and an increase in the proportion of women in 
management positions. Here as well, intensive monitoring could have a positive 
effect.
However, the tenacious anti-feminist norms and values that still prevail in 
India are hardly something that can be quickly dissolved or transformed. None-
theless, it is safe to assume that economic development and better education for 
women and, to a certain extent, increased formal employment opportunities for 
women alongside corresponding incomes would contribute to a change in values. A 
prominent example of this is India’s neighbouring country, Bangladesh, where the 
sex ratio at birth is fully in line with the biological standard. The factors contribut-
ing to this success – a combination of a labour-intensive industrialisation strategy 
(with a focus on clothing), a greater supply of jobs for women, and the expansion 
of state-funded education for women – have increased the economic participation 
of women within two decades and have, together, allowed for the normalisation of 
gender relations. That said, the level of women’s earnings in Bangladesh is still far 
from providing women with real financial empowerment and women are still sub-
ject to discrimination.
The Western industrialised countries could, from the outside, advance the 
cause of women in India by supporting women’s development cooperation with In-
dia (which has been stagnating since 2008) – namely, by supporting new and exist-
ing industries (as suggested by the G20 labour ministers) and by providing women 
with professional training opportunities for medium-level jobs. The latter measure 
is important since the labour-intensive industrialisation policy pursued by India 
calls for a massive pool of labour, especially female, with a mid-range rather than 
university-level education.
The Federal Republic of Germany is well positioned to provide career and job 
training assistance of this type, and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ, Agency for International Cooperation) – one of Germany’s main 
development aid agencies – is already active in the “Skill India” initiative in In-
dia. Furthermore, to realise this strategy at the EU and G20 levels, open markets, 
alongside appropriate direct investments, should also be encouraged, as should the 
support of Indian women’s associations. Finally, Germany and the EU must not 
underestimate the value of setting a good example in closing the gender gap in pur-
suing these goals. That said, it is worth remembering that the main responsibility 
for improving these societal conditions lies with India itself and that only a limited 
amount of progress can be achieved from the outside.
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